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Abstract
Continuous action space games are ubiquitous in economics. However, whilst learning dynamics in nor-
mal form games with finite action sets are now well studied, it is not until recently that their continuous
action space counterparts have been examined. We extend stochastic fictitious play to the continuous action
space framework. In normal form games with finite action sets the limiting behaviour of a discrete time
learning process is often studied using its continuous time counterpart via stochastic approximation. In this
paper we study stochastic fictitious play in games with continuous action spaces using the same method.
This requires the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory approach to stochastic approximation to be extended to Ba-
nach spaces. In particular the limiting behaviour of stochastic fictitious play is studied using the associated
smooth best response dynamics on the space of finite signed measures. Using this approach, stochastic fic-
titious play is shown to converge to an equilibrium point in two-player zero-sum games and a stochastic
fictitious play-like process is shown to converge to an equilibrium in negative definite single population
games.
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Continuous action space games are ubiquitous in economics. However whilst learning dy-
namics in normal form games with finite action sets are now well studied (e.g. [18]) it is not
until recently that their continuous action space counterparts have been examined. Oechssler
and Riedel [39] and Lahkar and Riedel [31] provide existence and uniqueness results for two of
the most commonly studied evolutionary dynamics: the replicator dynamics and logit best re-
sponse dynamics, in the single population scenario. Further results along similar lines are given
by Oechssler and Riedel [40], Seymour [41], Cressman [12], Cressman et al. [13] and Hofbauer
et al. [23].
Although these dynamics have been studied in continuous time for games with continuous
action spaces there are few existing convergence results for discrete time learning. Hofbauer and
Sorin [22] study a fictitious play-like process in which each player best responds to the average
action played by their opponent(s) rather than their opponent(s) empirical distribution(s). They
show that this fictitious play-like process converges to a global attractor of the associated best re-
sponse dynamic in two-player zero-sum continuous action games. Alternatively, Chen and White
[11] investigate a stochastic fictitious play-like model which would be difficult to implement (see
Section 3.2 for a discussion) which assumes each player uses a probability density function to
represent their beliefs. This rules out placing positive mass on a particular observed action, which
would correspond to a Dirac measure, and therefore does not have an associated density.
We study a stochastic fictitious play process in continuous action space games, in which be-
liefs are the empirically observed action distribution. This requires development of new stochas-
tic approximation tools to contend with the resulting measure-valued process.
Dynamical systems results of Lahkar and Riedel [31], combined with our stochastic approx-
imation theory, allow us to analyse a variant of stochastic fictitious play in single-population
games. We prove convergence of the stochastic fictitious play-like process in negative definite
single population games with a continuous action set and bounded, Lipschitz continuous rewards.
Furthermore we extend the results of Lahkar and Riedel [31] to the N -player case. This al-
lows us to analyse stochastic fictitious play in N -player continuous action space games. We prove
the global convergence of the logit best response dynamics for two-player zero-sum games with
continuous action spaces and bounded, Lipschitz continuous rewards. Convergence of stochastic
fictitious play follows by applying our stochastic approximation results. This extends the previ-
ous results of Fudenberg and Kreps [17], Benaïm and Hirsch [2], Hofbauer and Sandholm [21]
and Hofbauer and Hopkins [20] for stochastic fictitious play in normal form games with finite
action sets.
This paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 introduces the formal model which
we consider. Section 3 contains essential background material from Benaïm [1] and an extension
to this asymptotic pseudo-trajectory approach to stochastic approximation on a Banach space. In
Section 4 we analyse the stochastic fictitious play process. We develop the logit best response
dynamic for N -player, continuous action space games, and show convergence to the set of logit
equilibria in two-player zero-sum games with continuous action sets and bounded, Lipschitz
continuous rewards. Using the stochastic approximation framework of Section 3 we show that
stochastic fictitious play converges to an equilibrium for two-player zero-sum games with con-
tinuous action sets and bounded, Lipschitz continuous rewards. In Section 5 the work of Lahkar
and Riedel [31] covering the logit best response dynamic for single population, continuous action
games is reviewed and a learning variant of this, similar to stochastic fictitious play, is studied.
As in the N -player case, this stochastic fictitious play variant is shown to converge in single
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are presented to demonstrate that stochastic fictitious play can be implemented in the continuous
action case. Throughout this work many of the proofs are relegated to Appendices A, B, C and D.
2. Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action spaces
Consider an N -player continuous action space game. We use i = 1, . . . ,N to denote the
players. In a standard abuse of notation we use −i to denote all the players other than i. Let
Ai ⊂ R be a compact, convex action set and let Bi denote the Borel σ -algebra on Ai . Let
A := A1 × . . .×AN .
In discrete-action games a mixed strategy is described by a probability mass function on the
action set. In continuous action space games this approach must be extended. Let Bi denote the
Borel σ -algebra on Ai and let P(Ai,Bi ) denote the set of all probability measures on (Ai,Bi ).
In a continuous action space game a mixed strategy is a probability measure in P(Ai,Bi ). For a
mixed strategy πi ∈ P(Ai,Bi ) of Player i, πi(Bi) denotes the probability of Player i selecting
an action in the set Bi ∈ Bi .
As with finite action set games, if the population interpretation is being used then P i ∈
P(Ai,Bi ) is a particular population and selecting an action xi ∈ Ai using P i is interpreted as
selecting a member in the population who plays pure strategy xi . Alternatively, the strategy in-
terpretation can be used meaning that πi ∈ P(Ai,Bi ) is the strategy of a particular player and
an action xi ∈ Ai is randomly selected using πi . The focus of this paper is on classical stochas-
tic fictitious play using the strategy interpretation in N -player games; however, in Section 5 a
variant of stochastic fictitious play is presented which is designed for learning under the single
population framework, where A is the continuous action set and P(A,B) represents the set of all
possible populations.
Each player, i, has a reward function ri(·) : A → R. We assume throughout that ri(x) is
bounded and Lipschitz continuous. In a standard abuse of notation, if we have strategies πi ∈
P(Ai,Bi ) then the expected reward to Player i is
ri
(
π1, . . . , πN
)= ri(π) = ∫
A1
. . .
∫
AN
ri(x)π1
(
dx1
)
. . . πN
(
dxN
)
. (2.1)
Then, for xi ∈ Ai , let ri(xi,π−i ) = ri(δxi , π−i ).
Definition 2.1. A continuous action space game is a two-player zero-sum game if N = 2 and for
every x ∈ A
r1(x) = −r2(x).
Our main object of study is stochastic fictitious play, in which players repeatedly play the
game and respond to the history of play. The belief about Player i at iteration n, denoted by σ in,
is the empirical distribution of actions played previously; this belief is independent of the beliefs
about the other players. On each play of the repeated game a mixed strategy is then chosen which
maximises a perturbation of the expected reward when playing against this empirical distribution.
Fudenberg and Levine [18] formulate this microfoundation of the logit best response in discrete
action games, and Lahkar and Riedel [31] extend the definition to continuous action games.
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by
Liη
(
σ−i
) := arg max
πi∈P(Ai ,Bi )
{
ri
(
πi, σ−i
)+ ηνi(πi)}, (2.2)
where νi(πi) is the entropy of πi . If πi does not admit a density then νi(πi) = −∞, whereas if
πi has density pi then νi(πi) := − ∫
Ai
pi(x) log(pi(x))dx.
Following the logic of Lahkar and Riedel [31], the logit best response is given by
Liη
(
σ−i
)(
Bi
) :=
∫
Bi
exp{η−1ri(xi, σ−i )}dxi∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(yi, σ−i )}dyi . (2.3)
For convenience, for σ ∈ Δ we take Lη(σ ) := (L1η(σ−1), . . . ,LNη (σ−N)). Again following
Lahkar and Riedel [31], the logit best response for Player i as defined in (2.3) has an associ-
ated density function
liη
(
σ−i
)(
xi
) := exp{η−1ri(xi, σ−i )}∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(yi, σ−i )}dyi . (2.4)
Stochastic fictitious play in an N -player game can therefore be formulated as follows. For
each player i, the beliefs follow the recursion
σ in+1 = σ in +
1
n+ c
[
δxin+1
− σ in
]
, (2.5)
where xin+1 is the action selected by Player i on iteration n + 1, δx is a Dirac measure at x ∈ R
and c > 0 is a constant. The action xin+1 is sampled according to the logit best response Liη(σ−in ).
Let σn := (σ 1n , . . . , σNn ) ∈ Δ, and take σ 0 to be any joint probability measure in Δ. Stochastic
fictitious play is therefore defined as
σn+1 = σn +
1
n+ c
[
(δx1n+1
, . . . , δxNn+1
)− σn
]
, (2.6)
where each xin+1 is sampled from the distribution with density liη(σ−in ).
Note that (2.6) can be written as
σn+1 = σn + αn+1
[(
Lη(σn)− σn
)+Un+1], (2.7)
where αn=1 = (n+ 1)−1, Un+1 = (U1n+1, . . . ,UNn+1) and
Uin+1 = δxin+1 −L
i
η
(
σ−in
)
. (2.8)
This formulation lends itself to the study of stochastic fictitious play using the tools of stochastic
approximation.
3. Stochastic approximation on a Banach space
In normal form games with finite action sets, stochastic approximation is used to study the
limiting behaviour of stochastic fictitious play. The discrete time learning process is studied via
the continuous time smooth best response dynamics on the probability simplex, which is em-
bedded in standard Euclidean space. We follow the same approach for continuous action space
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sider P(Ai,Bi ) as a subset of the vector space of signed measures M(Ai,Bi ), to make use of
general theory applicable to vector spaces.1 When associated with an appropriate distance met-
ric, M(Ai,Bi ) is a Banach space. Therefore, in this section, we extend the standard stochastic
approximation framework to the Banach space setting. This will allow us to study the asymptotic
behaviour of stochastic fictitious play in continuous action space games.
In general, a stochastic approximation process in a space Θ is an iterative process {θn}n∈N
such that
θn+1 = θn + αn+1
[
F(θn)+Un+1
]
, (3.1)
where F(·) : Θ → Θ is a continuous map, {Un}n∈N is a noise sequence and {αn}n∈N is a sequence
of learning rates in R such that αn → 0 as n → ∞. If Θ =RK , standard stochastic approximation
results (e.g. [1]) show that the limiting behaviour of (3.1) can be studied using the ordinary
differential equation (ODE)
dθ
dt
= F(θ). (3.2)
This is commonly known as the ODE method of stochastic approximation, originally proposed
by Ljung [36] and extended by many authors including Kushner and Clark [28], Kushner and
Yin [29,30], Borkar [7–9], Benaïm [1] and Benaïm et al. [3].
Luenberger [37] provides the functional analysis mechanisms to investigate (3.2) in a Ba-
nach space setting; if Θ is a Banach space and F(·) : Θ → Θ is a uniformly continuous map
then (3.2) is well defined. Similarly it is possible to consider random variables on Banach spaces
(for example, see [33]).
This theory has allowed stochastic approximation to be extended beyond the Euclidean space
setting, with Walk [44], Berger [4], Walk and Zsidó [45], Shwartz and Berman [43], Koval [27]
and Dippon and Walk [14] producing convergence results for discrete time stochastic processes
on general Hilbert or Banach spaces. We provide an update of this earlier work (often called
abstract stochastic approximation) to the now common asymptotic pseudo-trajectory approach
of Benaïm [1]. We show that, under assumptions that correspond to those used in the Euclidean
setting, a linear interpolation of the {θn}n∈N process is an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of the
ordinary differential equation on the Banach space Θ given by (3.2).
3.1. Asymptotic pseudo-trajectory approach
The ideas in this section build on a rich history of work on stochastic approximation. In
particular we make use of the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory framework of Benaïm [1]. To begin
we review the key results on asymptotic pseudo-trajectories (see [1] for a more extensive review),
and verify that these also hold when Θ is a Banach space. Note that a Banach space is a metric
space, and we define d to be the distance induced by the Banach space norm ‖ · ‖Θ .
Definition 3.1. A semiflow Φ on Θ is a continuous map Φ :R+ ×Θ → Θ , (t, θ) → Φt(θ), such
that Φ0(θ) = θ and Φt+s(θ) = Φt(Φs(θ)), for any t, s ≥ 0.
1 The space M(Ai ,Bi ) consists of all μ : Bi → R such that there exists two finite measures on (Ai ,Bi ), ν1 and ν2,
such that for all B ∈Bi , μ(B) = ν1(B)− ν2(B).
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particular, let Φt(θ) be the position at time t of the trajectory of (3.2) that passes through θ at
time 0.
Definition 3.2. A continuous function ψ(·) : R+ → Θ is an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory for a
semiflow Φ if for any T > 0,
lim
t→∞ sup0≤s≤T
d
(
ψ(t + s),Φs
(
ψ(t)
))= 0.
Following Benaïm [1], we define an interpolating process of the stochastic approximation
process (3.1). Let τ0 := 0, τn :=∑nk=1 αk and m(t) := sup{k ≥ 0 : t ≥ τk}. Define the continuous
time interpolation of {θn}n∈N such that for s ∈ [0, αn+1),
θ¯ (τn + s) := θn + s
αn+1
[θn+1 − θn]. (3.3)
We need the following assumptions:
(A1) There exists a compact Λ ⊂ Θ such that {θn}n∈N ⊂ Λ.
(A2) F(·) : Λ → Λ is a uniformly continuous map and there exists a C < ∞ such that
‖F(θ)‖Θ < C for all θ ∈ Λ.
(A3) For all T > 0
lim
n→∞ supk
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1Ui+1
∥∥∥∥∥
Θ
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 0.
(A4) Given any initial choice of θ0 ∈ Λ there exists a unique solution flow in Λ to the differential
equation (3.2).
Theorem 3.3. Assume assumptions (A1)–(A4) hold and that ∑∞n=1 αn = ∞. Then θ¯ (·) :
R
+ → Θ , defined in (3.3), is an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory to the semiflow Φ induced by
the differential equation (3.2).
Proof. The proof is omitted as, other than the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖ being replaced with the norm
‖ · ‖Θ , the proof is identical to Benaïm [1, Proposition 4.1]. 
We note that assumptions (A1)–(A4) are extensions to those used by Benaïm [1] for stan-
dard stochastic approximation and are similar to those given by Shwartz and Berman [43].
However, verifying these for a general Banach space can be difficult. In particular, the noise
assumption (A3) has caused great difficulty. For example Koval [27] considers the simple case
when {Un}n∈N is an i.i.d. noise process whilst Shwartz and Berman [43] prove a very weak con-
vergence result for a particular process which again uses independent noise. In Section 3.2 we
provide conditions, applicable to stochastic fictitious play, which allow us to verify the challeng-
ing assumption (A3) for martingale noise in a Banach space.
Many further results can be taken from Benaïm [1] to characterise the behaviour of asymptotic
pseudo-trajectories. Here we present the result which is used in Theorems 4.4 and 5.4 to prove
the convergence of stochastic fictitious play.
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(i) Φt(A) = A for all t ∈R+ (i.e. A is invariant)
(ii) A has a neighborhood W ⊂ M such that d(Φt (x),A) → 0 as t → ∞, uniformly for x ∈ W .
Theorem 3.5. Let A be an attractor for the semiflow Φ with attracting neighborhood W , assume
that {θn}n∈N, defined in (3.1), satisfies (A1)–(A4) and that ∑∞n=1 αn = ∞. If Λ ⊂ W , where{θn}n∈N ⊂ Λ, then θn → A as n → ∞.
Theorem 3.5 is produced by combining Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 6.10 of Benaïm [1]
and gives us a method of showing that a stochastic approximation process on Θ converges to a
limiting set.
3.2. Noise criteria: the space of finite signed measures
We now focus on the space M(X,B) of finite signed measures on a compact set X ⊂ R.
By using an appropriate norm we can consider this as a Banach space. A greater discussion is
given to the choice of norm in Section 4.1. Here we introduce the bounded Lipschitz norm on
M(X,B). For a bounded, Lipschitz continuous function g(·) : X →R define
‖g‖BL := sup
x∈X
∣∣g(x)∣∣+ sup
x 
=y
|g(x)− g(y)|
|x − y| . (3.4)
Now let
BL := {g : g bounded & Lipschitz continuous with ‖g‖BL ≤ 1} (3.5)
be the set of bounded Lipschitz continuous functions with BL-norm bounded by 1. The dual
BL∗-norm on M(X,B) is defined for μ ∈M(X,B) as
‖μ‖BL∗ := sup
g∈BL
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(x)μ(dx)
∣∣∣∣. (3.6)
Here we consider the space (M(X,B),‖ · ‖BL∗). As discussed by Dudley [15] and Hofbauer et
al. [23], M(X,B) is a Banach space when paired with ‖ · ‖BL∗ .
We would like to show that assumption (A3) is satisfied for all martingale noise se-
quences {Un}. The additional complications of working in a Banach space do not allow us to
do so. However note that for stochastic fictitious play the Un take a particular form (see (2.8)).
In particular, let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space and {Fn}n∈N a filtration of F , where Fn repre-
sents the information available at the point the (n + 1)th action is selected. We are interested in
random measures of the form Un+1 = δxn+1 − Pn where the δx are Dirac masses at the actually
selected actions, and the Pn are the (absolutely continuous) smooth best responses used to select
the actions. So Pn is measurable with respect to Fn, whereas xn+1 (and hence Un+1) is mea-
surable with respect to Fn+1. We prove (A3) holds for this particular form of random measure,
although see Appendix A for more general results.
Proposition 3.6. Consider the Banach space (M(X,B),‖ · ‖BL∗), where X is a compact, convex
subset of R. Assume that {αn}n∈N is a deterministic sequence such that αn → 0, ∑∞n=1 αn = 0
and
∑∞
α2n < ∞. Also assume thatn=1
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where for all n
• Un is measurable with respect to Fn,
• Pn ∈ P(X,B) is a bounded, absolutely continuous measure which is measurable with respect
to Fn and has density pn,
• xn+1 ∈ X is drawn from the distribution with probability density function pn.
Then
lim
n→∞ supk
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 0, w.p. 1.
The proof of this result comes from approximating the Dirac delta in Un with a spike centred
on the Dirac measure. This spike and the density function pn can then be studied in L2. By
applying the convergence result in Proposition A.1 for L2 we conclude. This proof is given
in Appendix B. We note that the earlier result of Chen and White [11] assumes a compact,
convex action set and that L2-valued beliefs Pn are updated towards a symmetric, absolutely
continuous distribution centred on the observed action xn+1 ∈ X to ensure that Pn ∈ L2 for all
n ∈ N. However, no such distribution exists if xn+1 is on the boundary of X, so their process is
actually impossible. Instead we consider distributional beliefs, and approximate these with L2
spikes only in the proof of Proposition 3.6.
4. Convergence of stochastic fictitious play
We are now in a position to prove convergence of stochastic fictitious play in two-player zero-
sum continuous action games. Recall from (2.7) that stochastic approximation can be written
as
σn+1 = σn + αn+1
[(
Lη(σn)− σn
)+Un+1].
It is clear that this process fits the general stochastic approximation form (3.1). The theory of
Section 3 relates (2.7) to the logit best response dynamics defined as
π˙ = Lη(π)− π. (4.1)
We therefore investigate properties of this dynamical system. First however we need to revisit
the choice of norm for the Banach spaces under consideration.
4.1. Topological considerations
In discrete action games a player’s strategy is a probability mass function which can be stud-
ied on Euclidean space. Since all norms are equivalent on RK the choice of distance metric
does not affect the type of convergence that occurs. In the continuous action space framework a
player’s strategy is a probability measure, as already discussed. In the infinite dimensional space
M(Ai,Bi ) the choice of norm directly affects the type of convergence. Therefore it is important
to make a careful choice of norm. We consider two norms on M(Ai,Bi ), under either of which
M(Ai,Bi ) is a Banach space [15,42,23].
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supx∈A |f (x)| ≤ 1} then for μi ∈M(Ai,Bi ) let∥∥μi∥∥
T Vi
:= sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣
∫
Ai
f
(
dμi
)∣∣∣∣.
The total variation norm induces the strong topology on M(Ai,Bi ) [42]. Under this norm
continuity is natural in many cases, and so it is convenient when considering continuity and con-
vergence of dynamical systems. On the other hand compactness is less natural under the strong
topology, and in particular P(Ai,Bi ) is not a compact subset of M(Ai,Bi ) under the strong
topology, causing difficulty for stochastic approximation theory. Therefore the total variation
norm is used in Section 4.2 when studying the properties of the logit best response dynam-
ics (4.1).
An alternative norm on M(Ai,Bi ), which has already been discussed in Section 3.2, is the
bounded Lipschitz norm. This norm is discussed by Oechssler and Riedel [40] and used by Hof-
bauer et al. [23] and Lahkar and Riedel [31]. For μi ∈ M(Ai,Bi ) let ‖μi‖BL∗i be defined as
in (3.6) with the integrals now over Ai . The bounded Lipschitz norm induces the BL∗ topol-
ogy on M(Ai,Bi ) [15]. This coincides with the weak-* topology (often refered to as the weak
topology—see [5]) on M(Ai,Bi ) whenever this is metrizable [15]. Although the weak topology
cannot in general be metrized on the whole of M(Ai,Bi ), the weak topology and BL∗ topology
coincide on P(Ai,Bi ). Convergence under the weak topology on the set of probability measures
is commonly referred to as the weak convergence of probability measures (e.g. [5]). More re-
strictive conditions are required to obtain continuity under the weak topology when compared to
the strong topology, which highlights an important difference between these topologies. How-
ever, we show in Section 4.3 that P(Ai,Bi ) is a compact subset of M(Ai,Bi ) under the weak
topology, and the noise criterion (A3) for stochastic approximation can be verified using Propo-
sition 3.6. We therefore use the bounded Lipschitz norm in Section 4.3 when considering the
convergence of stochastic fictitious play using stochastic approximation.
There is a natural relationship between the strong and weak topologies, as discussed by
Oechssler and Riedel [40]. Huber [24] shows that for πi, ρi ∈ P(Ai,Bi )∥∥πi − ρi∥∥
BL∗i
≤ 2∥∥πi − ρi∥∥
T Vi
, (4.2)
so that convergence of probability measures under the total variation norm implies convergence
under the bounded Lipschitz norm.
Since the players do not evolve in isolation, we need to consider the belief processes in paral-
lel. Using the Cartesian product let Δ :=P(A1,B1)× . . .×P(AN,BN) and Σ :=M(A1,B1)×
. . . ×M(AN,BN). Thus stochastic fictitious play is a process in Δ, which is a subspace of the
vector space Σ . When we take the Cartesian product Σ := M(A1,B1) × . . . × M(AN,BN)
then it is natural to use the product topology. For μ := (μ1, . . . ,μN) ∈ Σ we have total variation
norm
‖μ‖ΣTV = max
{∥∥μ1∥∥
T V1
, . . . ,
∥∥μN∥∥
T VN
}
and bounded Lipschitz norm
‖μ‖ΣBL∗ = max
{∥∥μ1∥∥
BL∗1
, . . . ,
∥∥μN∥∥
BL∗N
}
.
Under either of these norms Σ is a Banach space as the finite Cartesian product of Banach spaces
with the product topology is also a Banach space.
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In this section the N -player logit best response dynamics (4.1) are studied using the total
variation norm to induce the strong topology on Σ . We aim to obtain convergence to a fixed
point and therefore it is important to show that such a fixed point of the logit best response exists.
Definition 4.1. The set of logit equilibria is given by
LEη =
{
π : Liη
(
π−i
)= πi, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,N}. (4.3)
Rest points of the logit best response dynamics (4.1) correspond to elements of LEη.
Proposition 4.2. If the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous then LEη is non-empty.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is presented in Appendix C.
Proposition 4.3. If the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, then for any initial
strategy π(0) ∈ Δ there exists a unique solution in Δ to the logit best response differential equa-
tion (4.1). In addition, the solution is continuous with respect to the initial conditions under
‖ · ‖ΣTV , meaning that for some k > 0 if π(0), ρ(0) ∈ Δ then∥∥π(t)− ρ(t)∥∥
ΣTV
≤ ekt∥∥π(0)− ρ(0)∥∥
ΣTV
.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is an extension to N players of results of Lahkar and Riedel [31],
and is also presented in Appendix C. It remains to present a global convergence result for the
logit best response dynamics (4.1) in two-player zero-sum games with continuous action spaces.
This is the natural extension to continuous action spaces of the discrete action case given by
Hofbauer and Sandholm [21] and Hofbauer and Hopkins [20].
Theorem 4.4. If a continuous action set game is a two-player zero-sum game with bounded,
Lipschitz continuous rewards then,
inf
π˜∈LEη
∥∥π(t)− π˜∥∥
ΣTV
→ 0, as t → ∞,
uniformly for π(0) ∈ Δ.
The proof of Theorem 4.4 is presented in Appendix D. To understand the shape of the proof
we need to introduce the set ΔD ⊂ Δ defined as
ΔD :=
{
π ∈ Δ : ∀i = 1, . . . ,N,πi is absolutely continuous with density pi such that
D−1 ≤ pi(xi)≤ D, for all xi ∈ Ai and pi(·) is Lipschitz continuous
with constant D
}
.
We show in Appendix D that ΔD is a compact subset of Δ with respect to the total variation
norm ‖ · ‖ΣTV . The Lyapunov function used by Hofbauer and Sandholm [21] and Hofbauer and
Hopkins [20] for two-player zero-sum finite action set games can be extended to ΔD , and the
compactness results in global attractivity of LEη within ΔD . To extend this to being a global
convergence result on Δ it is shown that starting from an arbitrary point in Δ the trajectory gets
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original trajectory is “close” to a trajectory in ΔD using the continuity of the solution flow from
Proposition 4.3. And the new trajectory in ΔD will converge to LEη and hence be close to LEη
at time τ1 + τ2.
Theorem 4.4 provides the global convergence of the logit best response in two-player zero-
sum continuous action games under the total variation norm. In Section 4.3 stochastic fictitious
play is studied under the bounded Lipschitz norm, therefore it is important that the global con-
vergence result of Theorem 4.4 is presented for the weak topology on Δ.
Corollary 4.5. If the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, then, with respect to the
weak topology on Δ, for any initial strategy π(0) ∈ Δ there exists a unique solution to the logit
best response differential equation (4.1) and π(t) ∈ Δ for all t ∈R+. In addition, if the game is
two-player zero-sum then LEη is an attractor for the logit best response dynamics for all initial
strategies in Δ.
Proof. It follows immediately from Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 that when the rewards are bounded
a unique solution exists and that LEη is non-empty. When the game is two-player zero-sum,
Theorem 4.4 gives that, for a solution to the logit best response differential equation (4.1), π(·) :
R
+ → Δ,
lim
t→∞ infπ˜∈LEη
∥∥π(t)− π˜∥∥
ΣBL∗ ≤ 2 limt→∞ infπ˜∈LEη
∥∥π(t)− π˜∥∥
ΣTV
= 0.
Since ‖π(t) − π˜‖ΣTV , converges uniformly for π(0) ∈ Δ it follows that ‖π(t) − π˜‖ΣBL∗ con-
verges uniformly as well. Now it is well known that the fixed points of a continuous map from
a metric space (more generally, a Hausdorff space) to itself lie in a closed set [25]. Therefore,
since Lη(·) : Δ → Δ is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the BL∗-norm when the rewards are
bounded and Lipschitz continuous (see Lemma C.2), LEη is a closed set. Then under the weak
topology on Δ it is a compact set since a closed subset of a compact set is compact, and from the
definition LEη is strongly invariant. Therefore all the conditions of Definition 3.4 are satisfied,
so LEη is an attractor for the logit best response on Δ under the weak topology on Δ. 
4.3. Stochastic fictitious play
With new results on stochastic approximation (Section 3) and convergence results for the
logit best response dynamics (Section 4.2) we are finally in a position to prove the convergence
of stochastic fictitious play.
Proposition 4.6. Assume that, for i = 1, . . . ,N , Ai is a compact, convex subset of R and the
rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Then a linear interpolation of the stochastic
fictitious play process (2.6) is almost surely an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory to the N -player
logit best response dynamic (4.1) under ‖ · ‖ΣBL∗ .
Proof. We verify assumptions (A1)–(A4) from page 184 for the stochastic fictitious play pro-
cess (2.7).
Let P(X,B) be the subset of M(X,B) consisting of the probability measures. For any prob-
ability measure μ ∈ P(X,B)
‖μ‖BL∗ = 1.
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tinuous functions, as illustrated in Section 3.2. Using the Banach–Alaoglu theorem (see e.g. [32])
the subset P(X,B) is compact under ‖ · ‖BL∗ . This means that, under the bounded Lipschitz
norm, assumption (A1) is satisfied for a process which remains in P(X,B).
When the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous it is straightforward to show
that Lη(σn) is Lipschitz continuous, and hence uniformly continuous, with respect to the
bounded Lipschitz norm (see Lemma C.2). Therefore, (A2) holds since the mean field in (2.7),
Lη(σn)− σn, is uniformly continuous.
When the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, the existence of a unique solution
to the logit best response differential equation is given by Corollary 4.5, which shows that (A4)
holds.
The noise assumption, (A3), is shown to hold by using Proposition 3.6 on {Uin}n∈N, for i =
1, . . . ,N . Let Fn represent the history of the iterative process (2.6) up to iteration n ∈ N. The
learning rate assumption of Proposition 3.6 is true since αn = (n + c)−1. Clearly for all n ∈ N,
Uin is measurable with respect to Fn, and since Liη(σn) is a bounded and absolutely continuous
measure on Σ for all n ∈N [31] the noise term is in the form given in Proposition 3.6. Applying
Proposition 3.6 gives that for i = 1, . . . ,N ,
lim
n→∞ sup
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uij+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗i
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 0, w.p. 1.
Since ∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
ΣBL∗
= max
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1U1j+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗1
, . . . ,
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1UNj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗N
}
,
it follows that (A3) holds. Applying Theorem 3.3 concludes the proof. 
The following theorem provides a global convergence result for the logit variant of stochastic
fictitious play in (2.6) for two-player zero-sum continuous action space games with bounded,
Lipschitz continuous rewards. This extends the well known result for stochastic fictitious play
in finite action two-player zero-sum games, originally presented by Fudenberg and Kreps [17],
Benaïm and Hirsch [2], Hofbauer and Sandholm [21] and Hofbauer and Hopkins [20].
Theorem 4.7. Consider a two-player zero-sum game, where the action sets are compact, convex
subsets of R and the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous. The beliefs in (2.6) almost
surely converge weakly to LEη.
Proof. These results follow immediately by combining Proposition 4.6 and Corollary 4.5 with
Theorem 3.5. 
5. Single population, continuous action space games
Whilst stochastic fictitious play is generally framed for N -player games, as in Section 4, it
is also possible to describe a discrete time process akin to stochastic fictitious play for a single
population framework. A continuous action single population game has an action set, A ⊂ R.
Throughout this section A is assumed to be compact and convex and B is the Borel σ -algebra
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defined over the measurable space (A,B). So for B ∈ B, P(B) is the proportion of players using a
strategy in B . P(A,B) represents the set of all populations on A. The game has a payoff function
r(x, y) for x, y ∈ A. As in (2.1) the expected payoff of the population P against a population Q
is
r(P,Q) =
∫
A
∫
A
r(x, y)P (dx)Q(dy).
For B ∈ B and fixed η > 0 the logit best response to a population P is given by
Lη(P )(B) :=
∫
B
exp{η−1r(z,P )}dz∫
A
exp{η−1r(u,P )}du.
Lahkar and Riedel [31] show that Lη(P ) has an associated density function which, for x ∈ A, is
given by
lη(P )(x) := exp{η
−1r(x,P )}∫
A
exp{η−1r(y,P )}dy . (5.1)
In a similar manner to the N -player logit best response dynamic from (4.1), the single population
logit best response dynamic on M(A,B) is given by the differential equation,
P˙ = Lη(P )− P. (5.2)
In the single population context let LEη be the set of rest points for (5.2). LEη contains the fixed
points of the logit best response map, i.e. the logit equilibria.
Definition 5.1. A linear, single population game is negative definite if for all P,Q ∈ P(A,B),
with P 
= Q,
r(P −Q,P −Q)< 0.
The game is negative semi-definite if the inequality is replaced with a non-strict inequality.
As discussed by Hofbauer et al. [23] the class of negative semi-definite games includes many
common games including, for example, symmetric zero-sum games. The following result is
largely taken from Lahkar and Riedel [31] although identical techniques used in Appendices C
and D are required to prove the result. For this reason the full proof is omitted.
Theorem 5.2. If the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, then, with respect to the
bounded Lipschitz norm M(A,B), for any initial population P(0) ∈ P(A,B) there exists a
unique solution to the logit best response differential equation (5.2) and P(t) ∈ P(A,B) for all
t ∈ R+. In addition, if the game is negative definite then LEη is an attractor for the logit best
response dynamics for all initial populations in P(A,B).
Sketch Proof. As in Section 4, the logit best response (5.2) is studied using the total variation
norm on M(A,B). An identical approach to the proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 proves a
unique solution to (5.2) exists andLEη is non-empty when the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz
continuous.
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as in Proposition D.4 for initial populations in a compact set ΔD . The convergence result on
P(A,B) for negative-definite single population games follows the proof of Theorem 4.4. Finally,
this result is produced for the weak topology on P(A,B) as in Corollary 4.5. 
Now we study a stochastic fictitious play-like process for single population games which is
similar to the population interpretation of stochastic fictitious play used by Ellison and Fudenberg
[16]. At each iteration every member of the population knows the true population Pn. A strategy,
xn+1 ∈ A, is randomly generated from the distribution with density lη(Pn). All the members of
the population observe xn+1 and a proportion, αn+1, of the population then revise their strategy
by abandoning their previous pure strategy in favour of xn+1. Alternative interpretations of the
learning process are available (see [21] for details). This discrete time logit best response learning
process is therefore given by
Pn+1 = Pn + αn+1[δxn+1 − Pn], (5.3)
where the action xn+1 is an action selected randomly from the logit best response density, lη(Pn),
and P0 can be any probability measure in P(A,B). The following theorem states the convergence
result for the iterative process in (5.3) which is based upon the logit best response dynamic.
Proposition 5.3. Assume that A is a compact, convex subset of R, the rewards are bounded and
Lipschitz continuous and∑
n∈N
αn = ∞,
∑
n∈N
α2n < ∞.
Then a linear interpolation of the stochastic fictitious play-like process (5.3) is almost surely an
asymptotic pseudo-trajectory to the single population logit best response dynamics (5.2).
Proof. The proof is omitted as it has an identical structure to the proof of Proposition 4.6. 
Theorem 5.4. Assume that A is a compact, convex subset of R, the rewards are bounded and
Lipschitz continuous and∑
n∈N
αn = ∞,
∑
n∈N
α2n < ∞.
If the game is single population negative definite then the stochastic fictitious play-like pro-
cess (5.3) almost surely converges to LEη under the bounded Lipschitz norm on P(A,B).
Proof. These results follow immediately by combining Theorem 5.2 and Proposition 5.3 with
Theorem 3.5. 
6. Examples
An important feature of any learning algorithm is that it can easily be implemented. This is
demonstrated in this section for extensions of two well-studied classical games. These extensions
both have reward functions which are linear in the players’ actions which allows the cdf-inversion
method to be used to simulate actions xi from Liη(σ−in ). If the reward function is quadratic thenn+1
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αn = (n+ 20)−1 and η = 0.005. In each pair of plots a sample from σ 1n is in the left-hand plot and a sample from σ 2n is
in the right-hand plot and the logit equilibrium of the game is also displayed.
Liη(σ
−i
n ) corresponds to a truncated normal distribution. If the reward function is more complex
then more sophisticated methods are required to produce a simulation from Liη(σ−in ).
In the first example the stochastic fictitious play algorithm of Section 5 is studied in a two-
player zero-sum extension to the standard matching pennies game. Let r1(x, y) = (x − 1/2)×
(y − 1/2) and r2(x, y) = −r1(x, y), where Ai = [0,1] for i = 1,2. For any ε ∈ [0,1/2],
σ˜ i = 1/2(δε + δ1−ε), for i = 1,2, is a Nash equilibrium, as is the joint strategy for both players
to play an action in [0,1] uniformly at random. However, there is a unique logit equilibrium in
which σ˜ i is the uniform distribution on [0,1] for i = 1,2. Theorem 4.7 shows that the beliefs in
the stochastic fictitious play process (2.6) converge to this logit equilibrium. This convergence is
demonstrated in Fig. 1.
The second example is a single population game, which extends the classic hawk-dove game
to the continuous action framework. For C > V > 0 let
r(x, y) = [1 − (y − x)]V
2
− xy C
2
,
and A = [0,1]. An action in A corresponds to an aggression level, so x = 1 corresponds to
playing ‘hawk’ in the classic game and x = 0 corresponds to playing ‘dove’. The first term in
the reward function represents the likelihood of obtaining a resource of value V and the second
term is the cost of ‘injuries’ sustained in contesting the resource. Both of these terms depend
linearly on how aggressively each of the players contests the resource. It is straightforward to
194 S. Perkins, D.S. Leslie / Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014) 179–213Fig. 2. Evolution of single population stochastic fictitious play-like process for the continuous “Hawk–Dove” game with
V = 1, C = 4, αn = (n+ 20)−1 and η = 0.005. In each plot a sample from the population is shown along with the logit
equilibrium of the game.
show that this continuous hawk-dove game is negative definite (see Definition 5.1), and so Theo-
rem 5.4 guarantees the stochastic fictitious play-like process in (5.3) converges to the set of logit
equilibria.
This game has infinitely many Nash equilibria as P = 1/2δV/C+ε + 1/2δV/C−ε is a Nash
equilibrium for any ε ∈ [0,min{V/C,1 − V/C}], but it has a unique logit equilibrium, as we
show. Let P˜ ∈ P(A,B) be a logit equilibrium, with associated density p˜. Because the reward
function r(x, y) for this continuous hawk-dove game is linear in x it follows that for any P ∈
P(A,B), lη(P )(x) ∝ ekx , for some k ∈ R. In particular, if P˜ ∈ P(A,B) is a logit equilibrium
then p˜(x) = lη(P˜ )(x) ∝ ekx . Normalisation2 implies that
p˜(x) = ke
kx
ek − 1 . (6.1)
Knowing that p˜(x) = lη(P˜ )(x) for all x ∈ A and combining it with (6.1) and the definition of
lη(P˜ ) from (5.1) allows the exact value of k to be calculated. A simulation of this game with
V = 1, C = 4 and η = 0.005 is shown in Fig. 2. In the discrete action hawk-dove game with
V = 1, C = 4 the Nash equilibrium is for 3/4 of the population to play ‘dove’. With these same
parameters the logit equilibrium here is also skewed towards the ‘dove’ action, capturing this
particular feature of the traditional hawk-dove game.
7. Discussion
In this work we present a method for studying the limiting behaviour of iterative learning
processes with an uncountably infinite action space. This extends the work of Fudenberg and
2 When C = 2V , lη(P )(x) ∝ ekx remains true, but k = 0 meaning the normalisation in (6.1) is not valid and the logit
equilibrium is a uniform distribution.
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[20] to games with actions selected from a continuous set.
To achieve this we have developed new tools for stochastic approximation. These build on the
asymptotic pseudo-trajectory approach to stochastic approximation of Benaïm [1] and extend
the abstract stochastic approximation approach presented by Shwartz and Berman [43] to this
now more common framework. As a suitable space for continuous strategies we study the space
of finite signed measures, M(X,B), using the bounded Lipschitz norm. Unlike Shwartz and
Berman [43] we provide simple conditions in the spirit of Benaïm [1] as to when the difficult
martingale noise assumption holds for the bounded Lipschitz norm on M(X,B).
In Section 4 we present the key application of this framework to stochastic fictitious play in
continuous action games. We extend the existence and uniqueness results of Lahkar and Riedel
[31] to the N -player case. As a consequence we can study a logit variant of stochastic fictitious
play for continuous action space games. We prove the convergence of stochastic fictitious play
for two-player zero-sum games with continuous action spaces and bounded, Lipschitz continuous
rewards. This extends the previous results of Fudenberg and Kreps [17], Benaïm and Hirsch [2],
Hofbauer and Sandholm [21] and Hofbauer and Hopkins [20] for stochastic fictitious play in
normal form games with finite action sets.
In Section 5 a stochastic fictitious play-like process in single population games is investigated.
The continuous time convergence results of Lahkar and Riedel [31] are extended to this discrete
time process to show convergence of a population for negative definite games with a continuous
action set and bounded, Lipschitz continuous rewards.
In Section 6 two examples are provided to demonstrate the convergence of these processes in
continuous action space games. This demonstrates that stochastic fictitious play can be imple-
mented in these games.
Our abstract stochastic approximation framework could also be used to study learning vari-
ants of the replicator dynamics, such as in [38,6] and [34, Chapter 2]. Although the replicator
dynamics are studied more frequently, especially in the continuous action space literature (see
[39–41,12]), the framework has limitations. In particular, the replicator dynamics do not gener-
ate new strategies, so that the limit point of a trajectory always depends on the initial conditions.
Even when exploration of the state space can be guaranteed convergence of an associated learn-
ing process is generally very slow. In contrast, the logit best response is absolutely continuous
and assigns some probability to every part of the action space, which makes it more straightfor-
ward to study the associated learning processes. This is true of the discrete action case, where
fictitious play and stochastic fictitious play are more frequently studied than similar discrete time
variants of the replicator dynamics, and remains true for the continuous action case.
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It is important for us to be able to verify that the noise condition (A3) holds for martingales
on M(X,B) so that stochastic approximation can be performed on this Banach space. Doing so
is not straightforward and requires us to use an intermediate result, proving that (A3) holds for
martingale noise on L2, presented in this appendix. The proof that (A3) holds for martingales
in Euclidean space [1, Proposition 4.2] relies on the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality to
study the martingale difference sequence and this inequality can be extended for certain Banach
spaces, notably L2. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space and {Fn}n∈N a filtration on F . Further
discussion of Banach space valued random variables is available in [33].
Proposition A.1. Consider the stochastic approximation process given in (3.1) on the Banach
space of L2 functions with associated norm ‖ · ‖L2 . If for some q ≥ 2,
(1) {αn}n∈N is deterministic with ∑n∈N α1+q/2n < ∞,
(2) {Un}n∈N is adapted and measurable with respect to Fn for all n such that
E[Un+1|Fn] = 0, sup
n
E
[‖Un‖qL2]< ∞,
then
lim
n→∞ sup
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1Ui+1
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 0, w.p. 1.
Because the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality can be extended for L2-valued martingales
the proof of this result follows a similar pattern to Benaïm [1, Proposition 4.2] for martingales in
Euclidean space.
Proof. The first issue is to ensure that the term of interest,
sup
k
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
, (A.1)
is measurable with respect to the probability space (Ω,F,P). Firstly, a topology, T , is produced
using the open subsets generated by ‖ ·‖L2 . T is the collection of all Borel sets on the space of L2
functions so that T forms the Borel σ -algebra on L2. Let B(R) be the Borel σ -algebra over R.
‖ · ‖L2 : L2 → R is a continuous function from (L2,T ) to (R,B(R)) and therefore an inverse
‖ ‖−1
L2
(·) :R⇒ L2 exists. Now for any open set A ∈ B(R), ‖ ‖−1
L2
(A) = {U ∈ L2 : ‖U‖L2 ∈ A}.
Since A is an open set it follows from the continuity of ‖ · ‖L2 that {U ∈ L2 : ‖U‖L2 ∈ A} is an
open set. Since T contains all such open sets it follows that
‖ ‖−1
L2
(A) = {U ∈ L2 : ‖U‖L2 ∈ A} ∈ T ,
and therefore ‖ · ‖L2 is a measurable function from (L2,T ) to (R,B(R)). Now, fix T > 0.
Since Un, which maps from (Ω,F,P) to L2, is measurable with respect to the probability
space (Ω,F,P) then for k ∈ {n + 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )}, the finite (countable) weighted summa-
tion,
∑k−1
αj+1Uj+1 is also measurable with respect to (Ω,F,P). Thenj=n
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k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
,
is measurable with respect to (Ω,F,P) as it is the composition of the two measurable functions∑k−1
j=n αj+1Uj+1 : (Ω,F,P) → L2 and ‖ ·‖L2 : L2 →R. Finally, (A.1) must be measurable with
respect to (Ω,F,P) since a finite (countable) supremum of measurable terms remains measur-
able.
Brzez´niak [10] shows that the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality can be extended for a
class of Banach spaces which includes L2. This means that for any q ∈ (1,∞) there exists a
Cq > 0 such that for an L2-valued martingale {Yn}n∈N and stopping time N > 0 then
E
[
sup
n≤N
‖Yn‖qL2
]
≤ CqE
[(
N∑
n=1
‖Yn − Yn−1‖2L2
)q/2]
. (A.2)
The remainder of the proof is an extension to the proof of Benaïm [1, Proposition 4.2]
for L2 using (A.2) rather than the original Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality. Let Wn,m :=∑m
i=n αi+1Ui+1 for m ≥ n. Since Ui+1 ∈ L2, it follows that Wn,m ∈ L2. Now fixing n ∈ N, we
have that
E[Wn,m|Fm] = Wn,m−1,
and hence Wn,m is a martingale in L2. Using (A.2) there exists some constant Cq > 0 such that
E
[
sup
n≤k≤m(τn+T )
‖Wn,k‖qL2
]
≤ CqE
[(
m(τn+T )∑
i=n+1
‖Wn,i −Wn,i−1‖2L2
)q/2]
.
Now by noticing that ‖Wn,i − Wn,i−1‖L2 = αi+1‖Ui+1‖L2 and using the original definition of
Wn,m gives
E
[
sup
n≤k≤m(τn+T )
∥∥∥∥∥
k∑
i=n
αi+1Ui+1
∥∥∥∥∥
q
L2
]
≤ CqE
[(
m(τn+T )−1∑
i=n
α2i+1‖Ui+1‖2L2
)q/2]
.
The remainder of the proof continues exactly as in [1, Proposition 4.2] with the only difference
being the norm used here is ‖ · ‖L2 and in [1, Proposition 4.2] this is the standard Euclidean
norm. 
Remark A.2. Brzez´niak [10] shows that the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality can be ex-
tended for a class of Banach spaces which includes Lp-spaces for any p ∈ [2,∞). The result in
Proposition A.1 for L2 can be extended to any Banach space in the class for which Brzez´niak’s
result holds with no alteration to the proof.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3.6
If we could show that M(X,B), with an appropriate norm, is in the class of Banach spaces
for which Brzez´niak [10] proves the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality holds then the proof
of Proposition 3.6 would be identical to the proof of Proposition A.1. However, we have been
unable to show this and so we are forced to take a different approach. Here we approximate all
Dirac measures with a spike of fixed width. This allows us to consider functions with proper
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also showing that the additional error term introduced in this approach is not significant.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Firstly, the measurability of
sup
k
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
,
with respect to the probability space (Ω,F,P) follows as in the proof of Proposition A.1.
Fix γ > 0. We approximate atoms in X by measures that have a spike density with base
width 2γ . Hence we need to consider an expanded space X¯ to accommodate spikes near the
boundary of X.3 Suppose X ⊆ [a, b] ⊂ R, and define X¯ := [a − γ, b + γ ]. Let ‖ · ‖B¯L, B¯L and‖ · ‖
B¯L
∗ be as defined in (3.4)–(3.6) but with integrals over X¯ and B¯ the Borel σ -algebra over X¯.
M(X¯, B¯) is the space of finite signed measures on X¯ and is equipped with the BL∗ topology
using ‖ · ‖
B¯L
∗ .
Consider arbitrary z˜ ∈ X ⊂ X¯, let h¯ be a spike density on X¯ centered on z˜ defined as
h¯(z, z˜) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
γ 2
(z − (z˜ − γ )), z ∈ [z˜ − γ, z˜]
1
γ
(1 − 1
γ
(z − z˜)), z ∈ (z˜, z˜ + γ ]
0, otherwise
(B.1)
and let H¯ (z˜) be the measure in M(X¯, B¯) associated with density h¯(·, z˜). We firstly show that∥∥δz˜ − H¯ (z˜)∥∥B¯L∗ ≤ γ
First note that if g¯ ∈ B¯L then g¯ has a Lipschitz constant that is not more than 1, so |z−y| ≤ γ ⇒
|g¯(z)− g¯(y)| ≤ γ . Conversely if |z − y| ≥ γ then h¯(z, y) = 0. Hence∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
g¯(z)
(
δz˜ −H(z˜)
)
dz
∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣g¯(z˜)−
∫
X¯
g¯(z)h¯(z, z˜)dz
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
[
g¯(z˜)− g¯(z)]h¯(z, z˜)dz∣∣∣∣
≤
z˜+γ∫
z˜−γ
∣∣g¯(z˜)− g¯(z)∣∣h¯(z, z˜)dz
=
z˜+γ∫
z˜−γ
γ h¯(z, z˜)dz
= γ. (B.2)
Hence
3 This is a particular issue which Chen and White [11] did not address when using probability densities on L2.
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g¯∈B¯L
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
g¯(z)
(
δz˜ − H¯ (z˜)
)
(dz)
∣∣∣∣≤ γ.
To use this within our stochastic approximation process we define H¯n := H¯ (xn) so that for all
n ∈N,
‖δxn − H¯n‖B¯L∗ ≤ γ. (B.3)
To examine the convergence of {Un}n∈N we also need to consider the convolution
q¯n(z) :=
∫
X
h¯(z, y)pn(y)dy, (B.4)
where h¯ is the spike density defined above and pn is the density of measure Pn and z ∈ X¯. Let
Q¯n be the measure on M(X¯, B¯) associated with q¯n. This is useful since h¯n+1 can be viewed as
an L2-valued random variable and importantly we have that
E[h¯n+1|Fn] = q¯n. (B.5)
Since both h¯n+1 and q¯n are in L2(X¯), (B.5) means that h¯n+1 − q¯n is an L2-valued martingale.
Finally, we need to define U¯n+1 = δxn+1 − P¯n, which is the extension of Un+1 to X¯, where
P¯n :=
{
Pn, on X,
0, on X¯\X,
and P¯n has a density function p¯n. For fixed T > 0 it is clear for k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T ) that∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1Ui+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗
=
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1U¯i+1
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(δxi+1 − H¯i+1)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
+
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(H¯i+1 − Q¯i)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
+
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(Q¯i − P¯i)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
. (B.6)
We address each of these terms in turn. Using (B.3) we see that∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(δxi+1 − H¯i+1)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
≤
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1γ ≈ T γ. (B.7)
The definition of ‖ ·‖
B¯L
∗ implies that ‖ ·‖
B¯L
∗ ≤ ‖ ·‖L1 , and a standard result for the L1-norm,
which follows from Hölder’s inequality, is that if X¯ is a compact, convex subset of R then
‖ · ‖L1 ≤ |X¯|1/2‖ · ‖L2 . Hence∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(H¯i+1 − Q¯i)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
≤ |X¯|1/2
∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(h¯i+1 − q¯i )
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
. (B.8)
We have already observed that h¯n+1 − q¯n is an L2-valued martingale sequence, and under the
assumptions of Proposition 3.6, since pn is bounded q¯n is also bounded, and there exists C > 0
such that
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n
E
[‖h¯n+1 − q¯n‖2L2]≤ sup
n
{
E
[‖h¯n+1‖2L2]}+ sup
n
{
E
[‖q¯n‖2L2]}< 2γ |X¯| +C2|X¯| < ∞
Using Proposition A.1 immediately gives
lim
n→∞ sup
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(h¯i+1 − q¯i )
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 0. (B.9)
Finally, following a similar approach to that used in obtaining (B.2), the definition of q¯n(·)
in (B.4) tells us that for any g¯ ∈ B¯L∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
g¯(z)
[
q¯n(z)− p¯n(z)
]
dz
∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
g¯(z)
[∫
X¯
h¯(z, y)p¯n(y)dy − p¯n(z)
]
dz
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
[∫
X¯
g¯(z)h¯(z, y)dz − g¯(y)
]
p¯n(y)dy
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
X¯
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
g¯(z)h¯(z, y)dz − g¯(y)
∣∣∣∣p¯n(y)dy
=
∫
X¯
∣∣∣∣
∫
X¯
[
g¯(z)− g¯(y)]h¯(z, y)dz∣∣∣∣p¯n(y)dy
≤
∫
X¯
γ p¯n(y)dy
= γ.
It then follows that
‖Q¯n − P¯n‖B¯L∗ ≤ γ, (B.10)
and from this∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(Q¯i − P¯i)
∥∥∥∥∥
B¯L
∗
≤
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1‖Q¯i − P¯i‖B¯L∗ ≤ T γ. (B.11)
Taking the appropriate limit and supremum of (B.6) and substituting (B.7)–(B.9) and (B.11)
gives,
lim
n→∞ sup
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1Ui+1
∥∥∥∥∥
BL∗
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
≤ 2T γ + |X¯|1/2 lim
n→∞ sup
{∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
i=n
αi+1(h¯i+1 − q¯i )
∥∥∥∥∥
L2
: k = n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )
}
= 2T γ.
Noting that the initial choice of γ > 0 was arbitrary completes the proof. 
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This section is used to present the proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. Lahkar and Riedel [31]
prove the existence of a unique solution flow for the logit best response dynamics in single pop-
ulation continuous action games and so many of the results in this section are natural extensions
to these previous results.
The logit best response dynamic, (4.1), is studied under the strong topology on Σ using
‖ · ‖ΣTV . Recall our compact subset of Δ, defined as
ΔD :=
{
π ∈ Δ : ∀i = 1, . . . ,N,πi is absolutely continuous with density pi such that
D−1 ≤ pi(xi)≤ D, for all xi ∈ Ai and pi(·) is Lipschitz continuous
with constant D
}
.
Lemma C.1. If the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous then there exists a D < ∞
such that for all π ∈ Δ then Lη(π) ∈ ΔD . In addition, both Δ and ΔD are forward invariant
under logit best response dynamics.
Proof. Let rmax := maxi,x ri(x) and rmin := mini,x ri(x). There exists a D¯ < ∞ such that for
every π ∈ Δ,
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)≤ exp{η−1rmax}|Ai | exp{η−1rmin} = D¯ < ∞.
Similarly there exists a D > 0 such that for every π ∈ Δ
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)≥ exp{η−1rmin}|Ai | exp{η−1rmax} = D > 0.
Furthermore, let L be the Lipschitz constant for all of the reward functions ri . Then
∣∣liη(π−i)(xi)− liη(π−i)(yi)∣∣≤ 2L|xi − yi | exp{η−1rmax}η|Ai | exp{η−1rmin} = L˜
∣∣xi − yi∣∣.
Taking D := max{D¯,D−1, L˜} proves the first claim.
Note that Δ is forward invariant under the logit best response dynamics if for i = 1, . . . ,N ,∫
Ai
π˙ i(dx) = 0. Now, by definition, for all π ∈ Δ, Lη(π) ∈ Δ. Therefore for π ∈ Δ
π˙i
(
Ai
)= Liη(π−i)(Ai)− πi(Ai)= 1 − 1 = 0.
Hence Δ is forward invariant under the logit best response dynamics.
Similarly, because Lη(π) ∈ ΔD it must also be that if π(0) ∈ ΔD then π(t) ∈ ΔD for all
t ∈R+, so that ΔD is forward invariant under the logit best response dynamics. 
Lemma C.2. If the rewards are bounded then the logit best response map Lη(·) : Σ → Δ is
Lipschitz continuous with respect to the total variation norm on Δ, meaning that there exists a
K > 0 such that for all π,ρ ∈ Δ∥∥Lη(π)−Lη(ρ)∥∥ΣTV ≤ K‖π − ρ‖ΣTV .
Similarly, if the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous then logit best response map
Lη(·) : Σ → Δ is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the bounded Lipschitz norm on Δ.
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of the density function liη(π−i ) for fixed π−i that is considered in Lemma C.1.
Proof. Let r¯ := maxi,x |ri(x)| and take π,ρ ∈ Σ . It follows that for every xi ∈ Ai ,
∣∣ri(xi,π−i)− ri(xi, ρ−i)∣∣≤ r¯ N∏
j 
=i
∫
Aj
∣∣πj − ρj ∣∣(dxj )
≤ r¯
N∏
j 
=i
∣∣Aj ∣∣∥∥πj − ρj∥∥
T Vj
≤ r¯
N∏
j 
=i
∣∣Aj ∣∣‖π − ρ‖ΣTV .
This means that ri(xi,π−i ) is Lipschitz continuous in π−i with respect to the total variation
norm on Σ . Then, since Ai is compact for i = 1, . . . ,N , ∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(xi,π−i )}dxi is Lipschitz
continuous in π−i and clearly for any Bi ⊆ Ai ∫
Bi
exp{η−1ri(xi,π−i )}dxi is also Lipschitz
continuous with respect to π−i . The ratio of two Lipschitz continuous functions is also Lipschitz
continuous given that the denominator is such that∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
dxi ≥ ∣∣Ai∣∣ exp{η−1rmin}> 0.
Therefore as the ratio of two Lipschitz continuous functions it must be that Liη(π−i ) is Lipschitz
continuous in π−i with respect to the total variation norm on Σ . It follows then that Lη(·) : Σ →
Δ is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the total variation norm on Δ, as required.
Now we prove the Lipschitz continuity with respect to the bounded Lipschitz norm. Fix
xi ∈ Ai . ri(·, ·) : A → R is Lipschitz continuous, so there exists a Lipschitz constant C such
that ∣∣ri(xi, x−i)− ri(xi, y−i)∣∣≤ C∣∣x−i − y−i∣∣.
Let r˜ i (xi, x−i ) := ri(xi, x−i )/(C+ r¯). It follows that r˜ i (xi, ·) : A−i →R is Lipschitz continuous
with Lipschitz constant C/(C + r¯) and maximum value r¯/(C + r¯).
Take π,ρ ∈ Δ. From the definition it follows that∣∣ri(xi,π−i)− ri(xi, ρ−i)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
A1
. . .
∫
AN
ri
(
z1, . . . , zN
)
δxi
(
dzi
) N∏
j 
=i
(
πj − ρj )(dzj )
∣∣∣∣∣
= (C + r¯)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
A1
. . .
∫
AN
r˜i
(
z1, . . . , zN
)
δxi
(
dzi
) N∏
j 
=i
(
πj − ρj )(dzj )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (C + r¯)
N∏∣∣Aj ∣∣‖π − ρ‖ΣBL∗ ,
j 
=i
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function mapping from Aj to R which has absolute value and Lipschitz constant less than or
equal to 1. The Lipschitz continuity of Lη(·) : Σ → Δ with respect to ‖ · ‖ΣBL∗ follows using
identical arguments to those which were used for the total variation norm. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Firstly, ΔD is shown to be a compact subset of Δ under the strong
topology. Let ΔiD := {πi : π ∈ ΔD} be the closed set of all absolutely continuous distributions
in P(Ai,Bi ) whose densities are bounded above and below by D and are Lipschitz continuous
with constant D. Appendix A.1 of Oechssler and Riedel [39] demonstrates that the topology on
ΔiD under the total variation norm is identical to the topology on the set of L1 density functions
on Ai under the standard L1 norm. Thus ΔiD is compact under the total variation norm if and
only if the set of densities functions of measures in ΔiD is compact under the L1 norm. This set of
density functions of elements of ΔiD is equicontinuous, since all of the densities have Lipschitz
constant D. The Kolmogorov–Riesz compactness theorem (see [26,19]) therefore implies that
this set of densities is compact. Hence ΔiD is compact under ‖ · ‖T Vi . Finally, ΔD is compact as
it is the Cartesian product of N compact sets.
Now, by Lemmas C.1 and C.2, when the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous
Lη(·) : Δ → ΔD is continuous with respect to the strong topology on Δ and Δ is a convex set.
Therefore, when the rewards are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, the map Lη(·) : Δ → ΔD is
a continuous map (with respect to the total variation norm) from a convex set to a compact subset
of Σ . Applying Schauder’s fixed point theorem completes the proof. 
The infinite dimensional Picard–Lindelöf theorem (see [46]) gives a method for verify-
ing (A4), the uniqueness of the solution to the differential equation on M(X,B) corresponding
to (3.2). This can be directly applied if F(·) : M(X,B) → M(X,B) is Lipschitz continuous
with respect to ‖ · ‖ΣBL∗ and ‖F(·)‖ΣBL∗ < ∞, however, it is possible to show that (A4) holds
even when this is not the case, as is demonstrated in the following proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. This proof extends the proof of Lahkar and Riedel [31, Theorem 5.2]
to the N -player case and has a similar form to proofs from [39] and [23]. Throughout this proof
B := (B1, . . . ,BN), where Bi ∈ Bi for i = 1, . . . ,N . Firstly, since Lη(π)(B) − π(B) is nei-
ther bounded nor globally Lipschitz continuous on the space of signed measures the logit best
response dynamics is studied using a secondary dynamical system. This alternative differential
equation is bounded and Lipschitz continuous on Σ and coincides with (4.1) on Δ. Since Δ is
forward invariant under the logit best response dynamics, showing that this alternative system
has a unique solution flow implies the same result for (4.1) in the case of interest (for any initial
joint strategy in Δ). For π ∈ Σ , denote the mean field of the logit best response by
F(π)(B) := Lη(π)(B)− π(B), (C.1)
and let
F i(π)
(
Bi
) := Liη(π−i)(Bi)− πi(Bi).
Similarly, for π ∈ Σ let
F˜ (π)(B) := max{(2 − ‖π‖ΣTV ),0}F(π)(B)
Now the logit best response is studied using the secondary differential equation on Σ ,
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If F˜ (·) is shown to be Lipschitz continuous then the infinite dimensional Picard–Lindelöf theo-
rem [46, Corollary 3.9] can be used to prove the existence of a unique solution to (C.2). So the
aim is to show that for all π,ρ ∈ Σ there exists a K > 0 such that,∥∥F˜ (π)− F˜ (ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
≤ K‖π − ρ‖ΣTV . (C.3)
As in the similar proof by Oechssler and Riedel [39], (C.3) is proved for three different cases.
In the first case consider ‖π‖ΣTV ,‖ρ‖ΣTV ≥ 2 then F˜ (π) = F˜ (ρ) = 0 and (C.3) is trivially
satisfied.
In the second case assume ‖π‖ΣTV ≥ 2 > ‖ρ‖ΣTV . Since F˜ (π) = 0, the left-hand side
of (C.3) becomes∥∥F˜ (ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
= (2 − ‖ρ‖ΣTV )∥∥F(ρ)∥∥ΣTV . (C.4)
Now it is straightforward to show that∥∥F i(ρ)∥∥
T Vi
≤ 1 + ∥∥ρi∥∥
T Vi
≤ 3. (C.5)
Where the first inequality follows because ‖Liη(ρ)‖T Vi = 1 and the second follows from the
assumption ‖ρ‖ΣTV < 2. Combining (C.4) and (C.5) gives∥∥F˜ (π)− F˜ (ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
≤ 3(2 − ‖ρ‖ΣTV )≤ 3(‖π‖ΣTV − ‖ρ‖ΣTV )
≤ 3‖π − ρ‖ΣTV .
In the third case assume ‖π‖ΣTV ,‖ρ‖ΣTV < 2 then the left-hand side of (C.3) becomes∥∥F˜ (π)− F˜ (ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
= ∥∥(2 − ‖π‖ΣTV )∥∥F(π)∥∥ΣTV − (2 − ‖ρ‖ΣTV )∥∥F(ρ)∥∥ΣTV ∥∥ΣTV
≤ (2 − ‖π‖ΣTV )∥∥F(π)− F(ρ)∥∥ΣTV
+ ∥∥F(ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
∣∣‖π‖ΣTV − ‖ρ‖ΣTV ∣∣
≤ 2∥∥F(π)− F(ρ)∥∥
ΣTV
+ 3‖π − ρ‖ΣTV , (C.6)
where the final inequality holds because 2 − ‖π‖ΣTV < 2 and using (C.5). Showing that F(·) is
Lipschitz continuous for ‖π‖ΣTV ,‖ρ‖ΣTV < 2 will prove the claim for the third case. Clearly,∥∥F i(π)− F i(ρ)∥∥
T Vi
≤ ∥∥Liη(π−i)−Liη(ρ−i)∥∥T Vi + ∥∥πi − ρi∥∥T Vi . (C.7)
By Lemma C.2 Liη(·) is also Lipschitz continuous when the rewards are bounded and so by
combining this with (C.6) and (C.7) implies that for some K > 3 (C.3) must hold.
Therefore using the result of Zeidler [46, Corollary 3.9] the secondary differential equa-
tion, (C.2), has a unique solution flow. Since Δ is forward invariant under (C.2) and coincides
with (4.1) for all points in Δ it must be the logit best response differential equation also has a
unique solution flow on Δ.
Continuity of the semiflow Φt(π0) follows by applying Gronwall’s lemma (see Proposi-
tions 3.10 and 3.11 [46]) in the same manner as in [31, Theorem 5.2] or the similar proof from
Hofbauer et al. [23]. This implies that for some k > 0 if π(0), ρ(0) ∈ Δ then∥∥π(t)− ρ(t)∥∥
ΣTV
≤ ekt∥∥π(0)− ρ(0)∥∥
ΣTV
. 
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Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 show that the logit best response differential equation satis-
fies the basic properties required to allow further study of the dynamical system associ-
ated with this differential equation. The obvious next step is to explore the behaviour of
this well defined dynamical system. In particular, under what conditions convergence to
a fixed point should be expected. Therefore it is desirable to produce a global conver-
gence result for the logit best response differential equation to a set of equilibrium strate-
gies.
As in the discrete action case the logit best response can be expressed as a maximisation
of an expected reward function and a perturbation term using the entropy, νi(·) as presented
in (2.2). In order to prove the global convergence of the logit best response differential equation
the following intermediate lemma is required.
Lemma D.1. If π,ρ ∈ ΔD with associated densities p,q respectively then for i = 1, . . . ,N ,
∫
Ai
[
ri
(
xi,π−i
)− η log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi)
= η
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi).
Proof. Rearranging the definition of liη(π−i ) from (2.4) gives,
ri
(
xi,π−i
)= η log(liη(π−i)(xi))+ η log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
yi,π−i
)}
dyi
)
.
It then follows by substitution that∫
Ai
[
ri
(
xi,π−i
)− η log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi)
=
∫
Ai
η log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))
π˙ i
(
dxi
)
+
∫
Ai
[
η log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
yi,π−i
)}
dyi
)
− η log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi).
Consequently, by rearranging these terms and noting that
∫
Ai
π˙ i(dxi) = 0
∫
Ai
[
ri
(
xi,π−i
)− η log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi)
= η
∫
i
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi)A
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(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
yi,π−i
)}
dyi
)∫
Ai
π˙ i
(
dxi
)
= η
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(qi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi). 
Two final concepts are needed before the global convergence result can be presented:
Definition D.2. On a Banach spaces X,Y the Gateaux derivative of a function F(·) : X → Y at
the point x ∈ X in the direction of u ∈ X is defined as
DF(x)u := lim
ε↓0
1
ε
[
F(x + εu)− F(x)].
The Gateaux derivative extends the definition of a directional derivative in Euclidean space
to the more general Banach space framework. If X is a separable Banach space, Y is such that
every Lipschitz continuous map f (·) : R → Y is differential almost everywhere and the map
F(·) : X → Y is Lipschitz continuous, then the Gateaux derivative of F(·) exists almost every-
where [35]. The Gateaux derivative satisfies the usual rules associated with differentiation, such
as the product rule and the chain rule (see [46, page 138]).
Definition D.3. Let Λ ⊂ M be a compact invariant set for the semiflow Φ . A continuous function
V (·) : M → R is called a Lyapunov function for Λ if for all t ∈ R+ the function V (Φt (θ)) is
constant for all θ ∈ Λ and strictly decreasing for all θ ∈ M\Λ.
Recall that
ΔD :=
{
π ∈ Δ : ∀i = 1, . . . ,N,πi is absolutely continuous with density pi such that
D−1 ≤ pi(xi)≤ D, for all xi ∈ Ai and pi(·) is Lipschitz continuous
with constant D
}
.
For the remainder of the article, assume that D is large enough such that Lη(π) ∈ ΔD for all
π ∈ Δ (see Lemma C.1). The following result extends the Lyapunov function used by Lahkar
and Riedel [31] to the two-player zero-sum case and confirms that this is sufficient to obtain a
convergence result on ΔD .
Proposition D.4. If a continuous action set game is a two-player zero-sum game with bounded
and Lipschitz continuous rewards then, with respect to the strong topology on ΔD ,
Vη(π) :=
2∑
i=1
[
ri
(
Liη
(
π−i
)
,π−i
)− ηνi(Liη(π−i))]−
2∑
i=1
[
ri
(
πi,π−i
)− ηνi(πi)],
is a Lyapunov function for LEη under the logit best response dynamics on ΔD .
Proof. This proof follows a similar form to that of Lahkar and Riedel [31, Theorem 7.3]. Fix
η > 0. Notice that for all π ∈ ΔD , Vη(π) ≥ 0. Also notice that by (2.4)
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(
Liη
(
π−i
))= η ∫
Ai
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)
dxi
=
∫
Ai
ri
(
xi,π−i
)
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)
dxi − η log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
dxi
)
= ri(Liη(π−i),π−i)− η log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
dxi
)
.
From this it follows that
Vη(π) :=
2∑
i=1
η log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
dxi
)
− ri(πi,π−i)+ ηνi(πi).
The Gateaux derivation (see Definition D.2) is used to check that Vη(·) is a decreasing function.
It follows that
V˙η(π) = DVη(π)π˙
=
2∑
i=1
ηD log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
x,π−i
)}
dx
)
π˙−i + ηDνi(πi)π˙ i . (D.1)
Each of these derivatives are evaluated separately. Firstly, note that Dπi(x)π˙ i = π˙ i (x) [31].
Using the chain rule gives
ηD log
(∫
Ai
exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
dxi
)
π˙−i
= η∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(yi,π−i )}dyi
[∫
Ai
D exp
{
η−1ri
(
xi,π−i
)}
π˙−i dxi
]
= η
∫
Ai
Dη−1ri(xi,π−i )π˙−i exp{η−1ri(xi,π−i )}dxi∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(yi,π−i )}dyi
=
∫
Ai
Dri
(
xi,π−i
)
π˙−i
(
exp{η−1ri(xi,π−i )}∫
Ai
exp{η−1ri(yi,π−i )}dyi
)
dxi
= ri(Liη(π−i), π˙−i). (D.2)
Since π ∈ ΔD it has an associated joint density p. Using the product rule gives that the second
term of (D.1) is
ηDνi
(
πi
)
π˙ i = ηD
∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
πi(dx)π˙ i
= η
∫
i
D log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ iπi(dx)+ η
∫
i
log
(
pi(x)
)
Dπi(x)π˙ i dxA A
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∫
Ai
1
pi(x)
Dπi(x)π˙ ipi(x)dx + η
∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ i (dx)
= η
∫
Ai
π˙ i(dx)+ η
∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ i (dx)
= η
∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ i (dx). (D.3)
Where the last line holds because
∫
Ai
π˙ i(dxi) = 0. Now substituting (D.2) and (D.3) into (D.1)
gives,
V˙η(π) =
2∑
i=1
ri
(
Liη
(
π−i
)
, π˙−i
)+ η ∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ i (dx)
= −
2∑
i=1
[
ri
(
π˙ i , π−i
)− η ∫
Ai
log
(
pi(x)
)
π˙ i(dx)
]
= −
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
ri
(
x,π−i
)− η log(pi(x))]π˙ i (dx).
The second line follows from Definition 2.1 because the game is two-player zero-sum. Applying
Lemma D.1 gives that
V˙η(π) = −η
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(pi(xi))]π˙ i(dxi)
= −η
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(pi(xi))][liη(π−i)(xi)− pi(xi)]dxi
= −η
2∑
i=1
[
νi
(
Liη
(
π−i
))+ νi(π−i)]
+ η
2∑
i=1
[∫
Ai
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))
πi
(
dxi
)+ ∫
Ai
log
(
pi
(
xi
))
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)
dxi
]
. (D.4)
Now by rearranging the definition of Vη(π)
−η
2∑
i=1
νi
(
πi
)= −Vη(π)+ 2∑
i=1
[
ri
(
π˙ i , π−i
)− ηνi(Liη(π−i))] (D.5)
It follows by substituting (D.5) into (D.4) that
V˙η(π) = −Vη(π)+
2∑[
ri
(
π˙ i , π−i
)− 2ηνi(Liη(π−i))]
i=1
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[ 2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))
πi
(
dxi
)+ ∫
Ai
log
(
pi
(
xi
))
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)
dxi
]
= −Vη(π)+
2∑
i=1
[
ri
(
π˙ i , π−i
)− η ∫
Ai
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))
π˙ i
(
dxi
)]
− η
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(pi(xi))]liη(π−i)(xi)dxi.
Now by first applying Lemma D.1 (with qi = liη(π−i )) to the first sum and then cancelling gives
V˙η(π) = −Vη(π)− η
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log
(
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
))− log(pi(xi))]liη(π−i)(xi)dx
= −Vη(π)− η
2∑
i=1
∫
Ai
log
(
liη(π
−i )(xi)
pi(xi)
)
liη
(
π−i
)(
xi
)
dxi.
The remaining summation is the negative Kullback–Liebler divergence measure of pi from
liη(π
−i ), which must always be negative. This implies
V˙η(π) ≤ −Vη(π). (D.6)
It then follows that under the strong topology Vη(·) is a Lyapunov function for LEη under the
logit best response on ΔD . 
Although we have shown the existence of a Lyapunov function on ΔD , we must show that
convergence occurs uniformly on all of Δ. Firstly, for a set S ⊂ Δ, define an open ball under the
strong topology on Δ by letting
BΣTV (S, δ) :=
{
π ∈ Δ : inf
σ∈S ‖σ − π‖ΣTV < δ
}
. (D.7)
This represents all strategies which are within δ of the set A under the total variation norm on Δ.
For k ∈R, let
Sk :=
{
π ∈ ΔD : Vη(π) ≤ k
} (D.8)
be the level sets in ΔD of the Lyapunov function Vη(·), meaning all strategies in ΔD which make
the Lyapunov function less than some threshold k. The following lemma shows that strategies
with small values of Vη(π) are close to the equilibrium set LEη .
Lemma D.5. For all ε > 0 there exists a κ > 0 such that
Sκ ⊆ BΣTV (LEη, ε).
Proof. Start by noting that if ΔD ⊆ BΣTV (LEη, ε) then the result is immediate since Sκ ⊆ ΔD
by definition. Hence assume there exists π ∈ ΔD such that π /∈ BΣTV (LEη, ε). Using the com-
pactness of ΔD under the strong topology on Δ (see the proof of Proposition 4.2 on page 203),
there exists a κ > 0 such that
210 S. Perkins, D.S. Leslie / Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014) 179–213inf
{
Vη(π) : π ∈ ΔD ∩BΣTV (LEη, ε)c
}= 2κ. (D.9)
Thus
Sκ ⊆ ΔD ∩BΣTV (LEη, ε),
since Sκ consists of elements of ΔD with Vη values bounded above by κ , and (D.9) ensures that
any elements of ΔD not in BΣTV (LEη, ε) have Vη values at least 2κ . It follows immediately that
Sκ ⊆ BΣTV (LEη, ε). 
It will also be convenient to bound the Lyapunov function uniformly across all elements of
ΔD .
Lemma D.6. There exists a C < ∞ such that for all π ∈ ΔD , Vη(π) ≤ C.
Proof. Firstly, notice that if rmax := maxi,a ri(a) and rmin := mini,a ri(a) then it must be that for
all π ∈ ΔD ,
liη(π)
(
xi
)≤ exp{η−1rmax}|Ai | exp{η−1rmin} = D′ < ∞.
Recall
Vη(π) =
2∑
i=1
ri
(
Liη
(
π−i
)
,π−i
)− ηνi(Liη(π−i))+ ηνi(πi).
It follows that
Vη(π) ≤ 2rmax +
2∑
i=1
ηνi
(
Liη
(
π−i
))+ ηνi(πi).
All that remains is to show that the two entropy terms are bounded for each player. Now
p(x) ≤ D for all x ∈ Ai means that p(x) log(p(x)) ≤ D log(D) for all x ∈ Ai and ∫
Ai
p(x)×
log(p(x))dx ≤ |Ai |D log(D). Therefore, by letting D¯ = max{D,D′}, it follows that if
C := 2rmax + 2η
2∑
i=1
∣∣Ai∣∣D¯ log(D¯),
then for any π ∈ ΔD , Vη(π) ≤ C. 
We are now in a position to prove the uniform global convergence of the logit best response
dynamics on Δ.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Take π(0) ∈ Δ and let π(t) be the solution trajectory to the logit best
response differential equation (4.1), so that
π˙(t) = Lη
(
π(t)
)− π(t).
It follows that ˙(π(t)et ) = etLη(π(t)) and subsequently that
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t∫
0
es−tLη
(
π(s)
)
ds. (D.10)
Define
σ(τ1) =
∫ τ1
0 e
s−τ1Lη(π(s))ds
1 − e−τ1 . (D.11)
It is immediate that σ(τ1) ∈ ΔD , since Lη(π) ∈ ΔD for all π . Furthermore, by (D.10),∥∥π(τ1)− σ(τ1)∥∥ΣTV < 2e−τ1 . (D.12)
So it has been shown that at time τ1 there exists a σ(τ1) ∈ ΔD which is close to the original
trajectory π(τ1). (Note that this initial construction is unnecessary if π(0) ∈ ΔD , but allows for
a simpler proof of uniform convergence.)
Let σ(τ1)(·) :R+ → Δ be a solution to the logit best response differential equation starting at
σ(τ1) described in (D.11). From Proposition 4.3 it follows that there exists a c > 0 (not depending
on π(0) or τ1) such that for any τ2 > 0∥∥π(τ1 + τ2)− σ(τ1)(τ2)∥∥ΣTV ≤ ecτ2∥∥π(τ1)− σ(τ1)∥∥ΣTV . (D.13)
Defining δ(τ1, τ2) := 2ecτ2−τ1 it follows from (D.12) and (D.13) that∥∥π(τ1 + τ2)− σ(τ1)(τ2)∥∥ΣTV < δ(τ1, τ2).
This implies that
π(τ1 + τ2) ∈ BΣTV
(
σ(τ1)(τ2), δ(τ1, τ2)
)
. (D.14)
Now note that, since σ(τ1) ∈ ΔD , Lemma D.6 shows that there exists a C < ∞, that does not
depend on π(0), such that Vη(σ (τ1)) ≤ C. By (D.6), we see that
Vη
(
σ(τ1)(τ2)
)≤ Ce−τ2 .
This in turn implies that
σ(τ1)(τ2) ∈ SCe−τ2 , (D.15)
where SCe−τ2 is the level set of the Lyapunov function defined in (D.8).
Given arbitrary ε > 0, let τ2 be sufficiently large that SCe−τ2 ⊆ BΣTV (LEη, ε/2), which is
possible by Lemma D.5. By (D.15) we have that
σ(τ1)(τ2) ∈ BΣTV
(
LEη, ε2
)
(D.16)
for all τ1. Then choose τ1 sufficiently large such that δ(τ1, τ2) < ε/2. By (D.14) we have that
π(τ1 + τ2) ∈ BΣTV
(
σ(τ1)(τ2),
ε
2
)
. (D.17)
Hence by (D.16), (D.17) and the triangle inequality we see that
π(τ1 + τ2) ∈ BΣTV (LEη, ε).
This shows the uniform convergence of trajectories starting in Δ to the equilibrium set LEη. 
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